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Case No. 20090359-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Amador Santonio,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated assault, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004); disarming a peace
officer, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004);
assault on a peace officer, a classA misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-102.4 (West 2004); and interfering with legal arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305 (West 2004). R. 2123-24/9; 2855-56/12.l This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009).

Because the appellate record contains thirteen pleadings volumes, the State
cites to the documents therein by both page and volume: R. page/volume.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES2
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ARGUMENTS:
1. Was Defendant's notice of appeal timely filed absent the completed
"notarized statement or written declaration" required by rule 4(g), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
2. Did Defendant's continued dilatory conduct in the face of express
warnings and an explicit colloquy by the trial court constitute an implied waiver of
his right to counsel?
Standard of Review. "'Whether [Defendant] voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. While
we review questions of law for correctness, a trial court's factual findings may be
reversed on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous.'" State v. Houston, 2006 UT
App 437,14,147 F.3d 543 (quoting State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 23,137 P.3d 716);
see also State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194, | 7,163 P.3d 707.
3. A. Were the summary contempt proceedings justified under these facts?

2

By order of June 23, 2010, this Court denied Defendant's motion to file an
over-length brief and permitted counsel to include Defendant's pro se arguments in
an addendum to the opening brief. Defendant's arguments are included in
Appendix D of his brief.
2
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3. B. Did Judge Laycock properly affirm the contempt order?
Standard of Review. We review a trial court's exercise of its contempt power
for an abuse of discretion. See Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238,240 (Utah
1976); see also Dansie v. Dansie, 1999 UT App 92, f 6,977 P.2d 539 ("An order relating
to contempt of court is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court."). Reversal of a contempt decision is rare and will not occur absent trial court
action '"which is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a
clear abuse of... discretion [.]'" Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, | 39,100 P.3d 1151
(quoting Dansie, 1999 UT App 92, | 6) (internal quotations omitted in Shipman).
4. Did Judge Laycock properly order re-evaluation of Defendant's mental
condition to fociis on its impact on his ability to form the requisite criminal intent?
Standard of Review. "[TJhe determination whether to order a psychological
examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86,
1f22,55 P.3d 573.
5. Should this Court review Defendant's claimed Brady violation absent any
attempt to establish the exculpatory nature of the subject evidence?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.

3
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6. Should Defendant's challenge to the exclusion from trial of defense exhibits
2 and 8 fail due to inadequate briefing?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
DEFENDANT'S PRO SE ARGUMENTS:
7. Should Defendant's challenge to the exclusion from trial of defense exhibits
28 and 29 fail due to inadequate briefing?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
8. Does the invited error doctrine prevent review of Defendant's claim of
error in the absence of an "attempt" instruction below?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue where
Defendant invited the error below.

•

9. Has Defendant adequately briefed his challenge to the lower court's denial
of his motion to arrest judgment?
Standard of Review.. No standard of review applies to this issue.
10. Has Defendant established any basis for application of the cumulative
error doctrine?
Standard of Review. "'A reviewing court will reverse a jury verdict under the
cumulative error doctrine only if the cumulative effect of the several errors
undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was had/" State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42,
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139,220 P.3d 136 (quoting State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, | 56,191 P.3d 17 (omission
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted in Gallegos)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 4(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is determinative of this appeal
and is included herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE3
The Beginning: 6/23/03
On June 23,2003, Defendant was charged with attempted aggravated murder,
a first degree felony; disarming a peace officer, a first degree felony; use of a
dangerous weapon in a fight, a class A misdemeanor; assault against a police officer,
a class A misdemeanor; and interfering with a legal arrest, a class B misdemeanor.
See R. 1-2/1. More than four years and eight volumes of pleadings later, on August
30, 2007, a preliminary hearing was held, and Defendant was bound over on an
amended information that changed the attempted aggravated murder charge to
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and left the remaining charges untouched.
•R. 2121-24/9.

•

The State includes only an overview of the lengthy procedural history of this
case. For additional information, the State refers the Court to Judge Davis7
summary of the procedural history of the first three years of the case, which covers
eighteen single-spaced pages. R. 1539-56/6.
5
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Delays began almost immediately. The court initially appointed defense
counsel, counsel withdrew within days, and the court directed Defendant to obtain
private counsel. R. 6-8/1; 11-14/1; 16/1. Defendant then actively began to
represent himself, filing the first wave of documents that would be filed countless
times in various forms over most of the next six years, including his first motion to
recuse Judge Fred D. Howard, his first request for access to adequate legal materials,
and his first complaints about lack of confidentiality in his contact with prospective
counsel. R. 20/1; 42/1; 47-54/1; 61-62/1; 186-221/1; 1555-56/6.
The First Competency Petition: 9/23/03-2/25/04
Three months into the case, the State discovered that a federal judge had
previously found Defendant incompetent to proceed and filed a petition seeking
inquiry into Defendant's competency. R. 105/1; 109-17/1; 342/2; 763/3; 1555/6.
Judge Howard recused himself, citing a federal lawsuit Defendant filed against him,
and the matter was reassigned to Judge Schofield.4 R. 133/1; 1554-55/6. Judge
Schofield granted the petition, ultimately ordering preparation of three evaluations.
R. 270-74/1; 277-80/1; 300-01/1) 306/1;335-36/2;352-56/2; 1553-54/6. Defendant's
counsel, appointed for the competency proceedings, withdrew when the second
4

Over the course of the case, Defendant filed numerous federal cases, naming
many, if not all, of the Fourth District Court Judges. R. 1558/ 6; R. 2963:8; R. 2973:16.
6
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evaluation was ordered. R. 223/1; 300-01/1. Five months after the petition was
filed, and despite Defendant's opposition to every interim ruling, the judge
determined that Defendant was competent to proceed. R. 361/2; 363-64/2. A
subsequent rotation of the judges left the case with Judge Lynn W. Davis. R. 516/2.
Proceedings and Delays: 7/14/04 - 9/8/05
Over the course of the following year, Defendant buried the court in pro se
paperwork, including the filing of:
—a challenge to Judge Schofield's competency ruling;
—multiple motions seeking contact attorney visits and confidentiality in
his mail and in his meetings and phone calls with prospective counsel;
—motions for access to legal materials;
—motions for discovery and change of venue;
—eight petitions for interlocutory review of various orders; and
—five motions seeking to recuse the judge.
R. 534/2-1148/4.
In addition to considering responses and arguments on the above matters, the
court gave Defendant 25 phone calls from jail to help him retain counsel. R. 65455/3. Thereafter, the State requested a colloquy with Defendant concerning selfrepresentation and his right to counsel. R. 678-84/3. Judge Davis began a colloquy,

7
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then granted Defendant an additional 25 phone calls and library access with which
to find counsel. R. 897/4; 1059-624. The court set a date for Defendant to appear
with counsel, but he refused to go to court, and was found to have impliedly waived
the right to counsel. R. 1061/4; 1544-45/6. On the State's motion, the district court
judge appointed a public defender for the preliminary hearing. R. 1059/4; 1061/4;
1544-45/6; R. 2964:24-25. The public defender objected and, after argument, the
court permitted counsel to withdraw and continued the preliminary hearing. R.
1059/4; 1063-68/4; 1069-71/4; 1078-86/4; 1091/4; 1104-17/4; 1128/4.
The Second Competency Petition, Contempt and Waiver of Counsel:
9/8/05 - 2/2/07
Two years into the proceedings — on September 8, 2005 — the State sought a
second competency hearing, arguing that Defendant " suffer[ed] from a mental
disorder resulting in his inability to consult with counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding/' R.
1137-38/4; 1209-10/4 (amended petition). Defendant immediately sought an
extension to respond to the petition and to find counsel. R. 1148/4. Judge Davis
granted the motion, ultimately staying matters pending the appointment of counsel.
R. 1178/4; 1674/6.

8
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It would take nearly two-and-a-half years from the filing of the petition before
the court was able to conduct the competency hearing. R. 1923/8. During that time,
the court ordered Kent Willis, of the Utah County Attorney's Office Civil Division,
to help Defendant locate prospective counsel. R. 1538/6. Mr. Willis advertised for
an attorney to represent Defendant and forwarded the three responses to
Defendant. R. 1180-84/4. Defendant not only insisted on participating in the
selection, but: (1) actively sought a court order requiring the State to provide
complete discovery to each of the responding counsel to ensure the necessary preselection "meeting of the minds regarding a defensive strategy"; and (2) filed suit
against the county sheriff and argued to the trial court that the suit prevented the
county from taking any part in the selection of counsel. R. 1188-90/4; 1195-99/4;
1212-15/4; 1543/6.

In the end, Randall Gaither entered his appearance on

Defendant's behalf on December 5, 2005, and was allowed to withdraw a month
later at Defendant's request. R. 1219/4; 1232/4; 1236/4; 1538/6.
Judge Davis ultimately granted the competency petition, ordering
appointment of two alienists and a stay of all other proceedings. R. 1240-53/4; 12981301/5. When Defendant refused to cooperate with one alienist, the court ordered a
third alienist appointed who was not on Defendant's list of alienists to be
disqualified. R. 1303-06/5; 1308/5; 1373/5; 1377-78/5; 1537/6; 1570/6; 1646/6.
9
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Defendant moved to strike the report of one of the alienists, Dr. Juan A. Mejia,
and, in open court with Defendant present, the court set an evidentiary hearing on
the motion. R. 1385-1402/5; 1454/5; 1456-68/5. When Defendant refused to be
transported the morning of the hearing, Judge Davis found him in contempt and
ordered that the case would not proceed until Defendant paid all witness costs
associated with the hearing. R. 1470-71/6; 1477-79/6. Defendant challenged the
ruling and continued in his repetitive efforts to recuse Judge Davis and to stay
matters pending entry of an order granting him access to an adequate law library
and confidential contact with prospective counsel. R. 1485-97/6; 1507-14/6; 151527/6.

Before the contempt challenge could be heard, the case was transferred to

Judge Claudia Laycock pursuant to normal rotation as of October 1, 2006.5 R.
1529/ 6; 1534/ 6. Defendant continued to file various motions, notices and affidavits,
despite Judge Laycock's recognition of the stay, pending the competency decision.
R. 1536-38/6; 1789-92/7. On October 2, 2006, Judge Laycock heard argument on
5

By that time, Defendant had been represented briefly by five different legal
counsel. R. 1559/6. However, nearly all the documents filed by the defense were in
fact prepared and filed by Defendant himself. Id. Judge Davis observed that while
Defendant's initial pro se documents included little or no legal support for his
claims, his legal filings improved considerably in the wake of his exposure to legal
resources and in light of his above-average intelligence. R. 1539-59/6.
10
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Defendant's challenge to the contempt order, ultimately refusing to vacate the order
but holding that payment of the fees would not stall further proceedings. R. 1570/6;
1672-79/6. She also denied Defendant's motion to strike Dr. Mejia's report, ordered
the additional competency evaluation requested by the State, and, thereafter,
attempted twice without success to appoint an alienist with whom Defendant
would cooperate. R. 1372-78/5; 1470/6; 1537/6; 1570/6; 1646/6; 1672-79/6.
In December 2006, Judge Laycock formally reviewed with Defendant the
various ways a defendant could waive his right to counsel pursuant to State v.
Houston, 2006 UT App 437,147 P.3d 543, conducted the requisite colloquy pursuant
to State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), discussed the objectionable conduct
that was to be curtailed, and granted Defendant a third set of twenty-five phone
«#

•

•

calls to prospective counsel as well as a continuance of the competency hearing to
aid in Defendant's search for counsel. R. 1684-85/6; 1723/7; 1726/7; 1766/7; R.
2970:19-22; R. 2971:passim; R. 2972:4. The judge also warned Defendant that if he
appeared at the competency hearing without counsel, he would have to represent
himself. R. 2972:18-19. Defendant appeared without counsel at the competency
hearing on February 2,2007, and asked that the hearing be vacated to permit him to
retain counsel. R. 1894/8. The court ruled that he had knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel by his dilatory conduct, ordered that he was to represent
11
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himself until such time as he retained counsel, and proceeded with the scheduled
hearing. R. 1851-52/7; 1869-70/7; 1919/8; 1889-94/8.
Following the two-part competency hearing, the court found Defendant
competent to proceed to trial. R. 1851-52/7; 1869-70/7; 1900-23/8. The court based
its decision on expert reports and testimony, the evidence and arguments, and the
judge's "own view of the defendant's intelligence, logic, reasoning, and rational
behavior." R. 1907/8. She agreed "without doubt" with the parties' stipulation
that there was "no issue with regard to defendant's ability to have a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings against him or of the punishment
specified for the offense charged." R. 1906/8. She noted Defendant's IQ of 111 and
commented that he "demonstrates at least that level of intelligence in all of his court
appearances." Id. Moreover, she ruled, he "consistently displays the ability to
consult with counsel—indeed, the ability to act as his own counsel." R. 1901/8.
Accordingly, she held that, although Defendant was "suffering from a mental
disorder, he [had] a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against
him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged and he [had] the ability
to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding."

Id. (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, she ruled him competent to proceed. Id.
12
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The Preliminary Hearing, Mental Evaluation, and Trial: 2/2/07 - 3/20/08
Judge Laycock's appearance in the case did nothing to slow Defendant's pro se
filings. In addition to filing a myriad of motions on new matters, he continued his
attempts to recuse the district court judge, to challenge venue and custody, and to
request relief for the alleged deprivation of his rights involving selection of counsel,
confidentiality in mail and phone calls, and access to legal materials. R. 1579-1603/6;
1604-16/6; 1623-45/6; 1705-21/7; 1731-33/7; 1737-41/7; 1742-64/7; 1799-1846/7;
1958-74/8; 2031-65/8; 2172/9. He also filed several additional petitions for
interlocutory review of various adverse rulings. R. 1648/6; 1691-94/6; 1728/7;
1771/7; 2094-96/9; 2144-47/9. The appellate court denied all interlocutory petitions,
and Judge Laycock denied or otherwise rejected the repetitive challenges filed in the
district court. R. 1619-20/6; 1621-22/6; 1667-71/6; 1696/7; 1778/7; 1857/7; 1875/7;
1872-73/7; 1986/8; 2011-25/8; 2255-57/9.
At his arraignment in September 2007, Defendant pled not guilty by reason of
insanity, prompting the court to order an examination of his mental condition at the
time of the offense, as provided in Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-301 (West 2004)1 R.
2121-22/9; 2128/9; 2136/9; 2161-64/9, 2174-77/9; 2206-10/9; 2212/9; 2215-17/9.
When the initial reports failed to adequately address "the appropriate criteria/' the
judge issued an amended order expressly directing that the evaluations address
13
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whether defendant, at the time of the offense suffered from a mental illness "that
prevented him from forming the intent" for the charged crimes. R. 2216/9.
Defendant challenged the order, the evaluators, and the ultimate reports, seeking to
remove the language pertaining to "intent" or to prevent use at trial of any
testimony relevant to such language, without success. R. 2261-80/9; 2478-79/10.
Seven months and two volumes of pleadings after the preliminary hearing,
Defendant represented himself at trial. R. 2540/11; 2548/11; 2596/11. After three
days, the jury found him guilty of all four charges and unanimously found that he
was not mentally ill at the time of the offense. R. 2586-90/11; 2595/11.
Post Judgment Motions and Sentencing: 3/21/08 - 4/28/09
Defendant filed a number of post-trial motions, sought the appointment of
counsel, and finally completed an affidavit of indigency. R. 2513-24/11; 2627-45/11;
2646-53/11; 2679/12. The court directed that he file no more pre-sentence motions
and appointed the public defender's office. R. 2679/12. Mr. Thomas Means
appeared for Defendant and was replaced by conflict counsel a month later. R.
2687/12; 2690/12. When Defendant claimed a conflict with new counsel, the court
refused to allow Mr. Means to withdraw and ultimately ruled that no conflict
existed. R. 2692/12; 2695-96/12; 2699/12. Mr. Means later filed a motion to arrest
the judgment, and Defendant again sought his withdrawal from the case. R. 273214
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74/12; 2780-81/12. The court granted the withdrawal, and Defendant filed his own
pro se motion to arrest the judgment. R. 2780-81/12; 2782-2835/12; 2845/12.
Following oral argument, Judge Laycock denied the motion, finding that Defendant
had failed to prove his claims. R. 2849-50/12. Specifically, the ruling reflected that:
(1) there was no evidence to establish that the facts proven at trial did not constitute
a public offense; (2) defendant had demonstrated his "sophisticated reasoning
abilities and above average intelligence during the pendency of this matterf,]"
supporting the jury's rejection of his claim of mental illness or insanity; (3) the judge
affirmed her previous decision that, following appropriate warnings, Defendant
waived his right to counsel by his dilatory conduct; and (4) no "attempt" instruction
was warranted absent a charge that he attempted to commit a crime and absent any
request for such an instruction from either party. R. 2849-50/12; 2860-63/12.
At the sentencing hearing on March 25,2009, the court addressed Defendant's
objections to the presentence investigation report, denied his rule 402 motion, then
sentenced him to the statutory term for each charge and running everything
concurrently except the felony counts, which she ran consecutively. R. 2854-56/12.
The judge also recommended that Defendant receive credit for the 2,103 days he had
already served incarcerated. R. 2855/12.

15
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Defendant sought to file a direct appeal, filing a notice of appeal on April 28,
2009. R. 2858-59/12.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 21,2003, Officer Ray Edwards attempted to execute an arrest warrant
against Defendant, who was riding his bike at Bridal Veil Falls. R. 2664/11.
Defendant swung his bike at the officer, hitting him with the rear tire. Id. The
officer pulled his gun and ordered Defendant to stop, and Defendant ran. Id.
Officer Edwards gave chase, ultimately reaching Defendant and grabbing him by
the arm. Id. The two struggled, Defendant attempted, without success, to take the
officer's gun from its holster, then Defendant broke free and fled on his bike. Id.
Several officers arrived and, after a brief search, found Defendant hiding
under a tree. Id. Defendant once again fled, only to run into Officer Mike Reynolds
and Deputy Jens Horn. Id. Officer Reynolds drew his weapon and ordered
Defendant to lie down, then noticed that Defendant was holding a knife. R.
2663/11. Officer Reynolds yelled, "Knife!" as Defendant swung it towards him.
Deputy Horn tackled Defendant from the side, ultimately subduing him. Id. Only
after Defendant was in custody did the deputy feel a dull pain in his upper chest
area. Id. He discovered a cut in his shirt and an incision in his chest. Id. He was
treated at the hospital for a wound approximately 1" long and 1 W' deep. Id.
16
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant's no tic of appeal was untimely filed, leaving this Court
without jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
Point II. Most of Defendant's challenges to the lower court's determination
that he waived his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct should be
summarily rejected by this Court because they are presented without reference to
legal or record support and lack meaningful analysis. A review of the relevant
proceedings below demonstrates that Judge Laycock handled the matter thoroughly
and completely and demonstrates that Defendant's claim of confusion lacks merit.
Point III. Summary contempt proceedings were appropriate where the
contempt occurred in open court, disturbed the court's business, and necessitated
immediate punishment. In any event, Defendant had reasonable notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard as to his contemptuous conduct when he
challenged the contempt order both verbally and in writing. His failure to marshal
the evidence to support his challenge to Judge Laycock's findings defeats the
remainder of his claim of error. Nevertheless, Judge Laycock's rejection of the
defense that the minute entry given to Defendant reflected a different time is fully
supported by the Judge's ability to review the minute entry, which was admitted

17
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into evidence at the hearing, as well as evidence placing Defendant in court when
Judge Davis set the hearing for 8:30 a.m.
Point IV. Defendant's challenge to Judge Lay cock's amended order for an
evaluation of Defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense fails for
inadequate briefing. In any event, his claim is without merit where the order
accurately reflects the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 and does not
address the admissibility of the information in the evaluations but leaves the issue
of admissibility to be determined at trial.
Point V. Defendant's claim of a Brady violation lacks merit where he makes
no attempt to establish that the computer disc he sought below included any
material exculpatory evidence. His claim that the disc "contains evidence in digital
form that is exculpatory" is wholly inadequate to establish his claim of error.
Point VI. Defendant's challenge to exclusion of a police report and a crime
lab report offered by the defense at trial fails for inadequate briefing.
Point VII. Defendant's challenge to exclusion of two previous competency
rulings lacks sufficient authority or analysis to permit appellate review and should
be summarily rejected due to inadequate briefing.
Point VIII. Defendant invited any error in the court's failure to give his
proposed jury instruction defining "attempt" when, after discussing instructions on
18
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the last day of trial, he made no mention of the missing instruction and ultimately
agreed to the instructions as they were given.
Point IX. Defendant's claim of per se error in the trial court's failure to arrest
judgment due to the absence of a jury instruction defining "attempt" fails for
inadequate briefing. His claim that the conduct of jail personnel throughout the
proceedings below robbed him of his right to counsel of choice and warranted an
arrest of judgment "as a matter of law" also lacks the full support and analysis
required by this Court's briefing rules and should be summarily rejected.
Point X Defendant's claim of cumulative error fails in the absence of his
ability to establish any errors that undermine confidence that he obtained a fair trial.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL IS UNTIMELY ABSENT A
COMPLETED "NOTARIZED STATEMENT OR WRITTEN
DECLARATION/' LEAVING THIS COURT WITHOUT
JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL
This case is before this Court on a direct appeal from a criminal conviction
and sentencing. Defendant's pro se notice of appeal, however, was untimely filed,
preventing this Court from acquiring jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
appeal. See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, f 7,13 P.3d 616 ("If an
appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.").
19
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A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of the order or
judgment appealed. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The time period for filing an appeal is
jurisdictional. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, <f 5,57 P.3d 1065. In a criminal case,
it is the sentence that constitutes the final judgment from which to appeal. See id. at
% 4. However, in the case of an inmate confined in an institution, "the notice of
appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or
before the last day for filing/, Utah R. App. P. 4(g).
Judgment was entered below on March 25,2009. R. 2854-56/12. Hence,
the pro se notice of appeal was due on Friday, April 24. It was stamped by the
court as received the following Tuesday, April 28. R. 2859/12. Defendant claims
that the notice of appeal was timely filed under subsection 4(g) because he filed it
<0

by putting it in the prison mail on April 20. See Aplt. Br. at 12.
The inmate rule does not salvage this appeal, however, because Defendant
failed to comply with its provisions. The rule provides that "[t]imely filing may
be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of
deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid/' Utah R. App. P.
4(g). The notice of appeal contained in the appellate record reflects that it was
signed on April 17 and is accompanied by a "Certificate of Mailing/' See R.
2858-59/12 (copy of Notice of Appeal is attached in Addendum A). However,
20
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the date on which the document was mailed is blank, reflecting only that it was
mailed, postage pre-paid, "on

_ , 2009[.]" R. 2858/12. The envelope is in

which it was sent is not attached to clarify the matter.
Defendant claims that the State stipulated to a mailing date of April 20. See
Aplt. Br. at 12. He is referring to the State's response to his pre-briefing "Motion
for Extraordinary Relief" which this Court treated as a motion to stay. The
State's response—filed nine months before the appellate record was filed —
explained that the State's case file included the envelope in which it received a
copy of the notice of appeal. R. 2875. That envelope reflects a metered date of
April 20, which would be within the time provided by rule 4(g). See copy of
envelope (attached in Addendum B).
The envelope, however, establishes nothing more than the fact that the
State's copy of the notice of appeal was sent on April 20. It does not establish
that the court's copy was sent at the same time, and he does not explain why, if
they were sent simultaneously, the State's document was stamped as received on
April 21 while the court's was not received until April 28. See State's Notice of
Appeal (attached in Addendum B); R. 2859. Neither does the State's envelope
amount to the "notarized statement or written declaration" required by rule 4(g).
Utah R. App. P. 4(g). An incomplete mailing certificate is tantamount to no
21
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certificate at all. Thus, this Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. See Stack v. Hatch, 2008 UT App 290U, | 3 , nl (the inmate rule did not
invoke appellate jurisdiction where Hatch failed to file a notarized statement
showing compliance with the rule); see also Serrato, 2000 UT App 299, \ 7.
••'

II.

DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED DILATORY CONDUCT AFTER
EXPRESS WARNINGS AND AN EXPLICIT COLLOQUY
IMPLIEDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Defendant claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel by finding that he had impliedly waived his right to counsel and would,
therefore, have to represent himself. See Aplt. Br. at 28-35. He maintains that the
trial court's waiver declaration was premature and, hence, erroneous because: (1)
Defendant had a mental health condition the court knew affected his ability to
choose counsel; (2) Defendant had a subjective belief that confidentiality was a
"precursor" to retaining counsel; (3) the circumstances required the court "to go to
additional lengths to secure [defense] counsel[;]" and (4) the grant of unmonitored
phone calls and the direction that Defendant seek an ACLU attorney were
confusing, casting doubt on the validity of the waiver that should be resolved in
Defendant's favor. Id. at 30-35. Finally, he claims, the court was obliged to appoint
stand-by counsel before requiring him to proceed pro se. See id. at 34.
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A. Most of Defendant's Arguments are Inadequately Briefed
This Court need not address the majority of Defendant's arguments because
they are not in compliance with this Court's briefing rule. See State v. Sloan, 2003 UT
App 170, f 15,72 P.3d 138 (refusing to address inadequately briefed issues); see also
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941,948 (Utah 1998) (an inadequately briefed argument
need not be addressed on appeal and may result in summary affirmance). Rule
24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires, among other things, that
each argument briefed on appeal "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented,... with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on/' Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The appellant
cannot simply dump the burden of their argument and research on the appellate
court. See Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Or., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^ 46,70 P.3d 904.
Here, most of Defendant's arguments simply state a proposition without
providing meaningful legal analysis or record support. His claim that his mental
condition affected his ability to choose counsel and that the trial court knew of the
connection lacks not only record citation, but citation to authority identifying the
condition and connecting it to his ability to choose counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 30, 32,
35. To the contrary, Judge Laycock ultimately rejected the idea, finding that
Defendant possessed "the ability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
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proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding/' R.
1901/8.
Even if, as he claims, it was reasonable for him to believe that confidentiality
must occur before he could hire counsel, he provides no authority to establish that
his belief justifies his failure to hire counsel and prevents an implied waiver given
the trial court's express warnings and colloquy. See Aplt. Br. at 32-33.
Similarly, he offers no authority for his assertions that the trial court is
responsible for enforcing confidentiality at the jail or that the judge was required to
make additional efforts to secure counsel for him, despite his repeated insistence
below on retaining his own counsel.6 See id. at 31-33.

6

It is difficult to know what more the court could have done. The court tried
any number of ways to assist Defendant in obtaining counsel, including: appointing
counsel numerous times, appointing counsel for specific purposes, calling around to
secure conflict counsel, enlisting the help of the civil division of the county
attorney's office to advertise for counsel, continuing countless hearings to permit
Defendant more time to retain counsel, granting Defendant 75 confidential phone
calls to prospective counsel, and inviting Defendant to send letters to prospective
counsel, directing him as to wording so as to increase the odds of getting responses.
See, e.g., R. 6-8/1; 223/1; 654-55/3; 897/4; 1031/4; 1059-62/4; 1383/5; 1538-56/6;
1559/6; 2684/12; 2687/12; R. 2963:46; R. 2970:19-22. Defendant ultimately resisted
all the court's efforts. See generally R. 2964:39, 43 (filing a federal suit against the
judge when he attempted to appoint counsel); R. 651/3 (rejecting female counsel); R.
2964:52-53 (rejecting female counsel); R. 2971:25; R. 2972:12-13 (objecting to Judge
Lay cock's offer to call the warden to ensure confidentiality, calling it an improper ex
parte communication).
24
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Defendant fails to demonstrate that appointment of stand-by counsel is a
precursor to an implied waiver of the right to counsel. See id. at 34. Not only does
the claim lack authority and analysis, it ignores Defendant's failure to request standby counsel below, and when Judge Davis attempted to appoint conflict counsel in a
supervisory capacity, Defendant filed a federal lawsuit against the judge. R.
2964:39,43.
Because these claims lack legal authority, record support and/ or meaningful
legal analysis, this Court should decline to address them. See State v. Garner, 2002
UT App 234,118,13,52 P.3d 467.
B. The Record Demonstrates a Voluntary, Knowing, and
Intelligent Waiver by Conduct
Defendant also claims that he was confused by the court's grant of additional
confidential phone calls with which to hire counsel, followed by a suggestion from
the judge that Defendant "hire an attorney to assist him in hiring an attorney/' See
Aplt Br. at 33. That confusion, he contends, prevents imposition of an implied
waiver. See id. at 34 (citing State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28,137 P.3d 716). His argument
fails inasmuch as the record reveals no confusion in the lower court's discussion.
The Sixth Amendment implicitly allows a defendant to waive the right to the
assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,818-32

25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(1975); State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194,115,163 P.3d 707. The Utah Supreme
Court has identified three ways a defendant may waive his right to counsel. See
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 27; Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194,115; accord State v. Houston,
2006 UT App 437, | | 6-7,147 P.3d 543. First, a defendant may relinquish his right
to counsel by "true waiver" through an on-the-record colloquy with the trial court
in which the defendant is informed of the importance of counsel and still chooses
knowingly and voluntarily to proceed pro se. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f|[ 27-30.
Second, a defendant may forfeit his right to counsel through "'extremely dilatory
conduct' or abusive behavior, such as physically assaulting counsel." Id. at f ^f 31-32
(quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1101 (3d Cir.1995)). Finally, a
defendant may give up his right to counsel through "waiver by conduct" or
"implied waiver," which occurs when a defendant who has been warned that he
will lose his right to counsel if he continues to engage in dilatory tactics continues to
misbehave. Id. at ^ 33; see also Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194, f 15.
An implied waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Cabrera,
2007 UT App 194, |^f 15-16. To be voluntary, the court must warn defendant of the
unacceptable conduct at issue and that its continuation will result in a waiver of the
right to counsel. See id. at ^ 16. "Unacceptable conduct" includes a defendant's
failure to hire an attorney despite having the financial resources to do so. Pedockie,
26
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2006 UT 28, f 35, n. 36. To be knowing and intelligent, the court must ensure that
defendant is aware of the "'disadvantages and dangers of self-representation[.]'"
Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194,116 (quoting Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 39). The best means
to ensure that a waiver is knowing and intelligent is a colloquy on the record. See id.
Defendant does not contend that he was not informed of the unacceptable
conduct, of the potential result of its continuation, or of the pitfalls of selfrepresentation. See Aplt. Br. at 28-35. Instead, he claims that Judge Laycock's
explanations confused him and dictate against a finding of waiver by conduct. See
id. at 33-34. His claim lacks record support.
Judge Laycock issued the necessary explanations and warnings and
conducted a thorough colloquy before finding that Defendant's continued dilatory
conduct waived his right to counsel. She began on November 13,2006—three-andone-half years into the proceedings and fifteen months prior to trial. The parties
met in court to discuss the status of the competency proceedings. R. 2970:2. The
judge explained the objectionable conduct to Defendant: his dilatory efforts to
obtain counsel, despite having "upwards of 50 [court-ordered] phone calls" to
obtain counsel, having "one of the best" defense counsel available to him, and
having and rejecting "the opportunity to have very fine Counsel[.]" R. 2970:18-25.
They discussed Defendant's concerns for confidentiality and his perceived need to
27
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acquire "the equivalent of a law school education" before he could make an
informed decision about who to hire. R. 2970:18-22. In the end, the court made it
clear to Defendant that neither concern was to delay his retention of counsel any
longer and that his appearance without counsel at the competency hearing would
mean he had decided to represent himself and would waive the right to counsel. R.
2970:18-19. The judge then gave Defendant 25 additional confidential phone calls —
in addition to the 50 previously been given by other judges — to facilitate his search
for counsel before the competency hearing. R. 2970:19-23. Thus, the judge gave
Defendant the information necessary to render his subsequent waiver voluntary.
See Houston, 2006 UT App 437, f 8.
The colloquy establishing that the waiver was knowing and intelligent
occurred at the next hearing. After setting the competency hearing for December 20,
Judge Laycock checked over the following days for an entry of appearance by
defense counsel. . R. 2970:23; R. 2971:2-3. Seeing none, she set a hearing for
December 4 to assess the status of Defendant's search. R. 2971:2-4. She discovered
that Defendant had waited a week after the previous hearing before initiating any
call for counsel. R. 2971:5-6. Defendant claimed to have been waiting for a written
order from the court and, when asked about his "last real efforts" to obtain counsel,
he confirmed that they were in early 2006. R. 2971:5-8.
28
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Defendant's continued dilatory efforts prompted the judge to proceed with
the colloquy required by Houston. R. 2973:10. She began by obtaining Defendant's
assurance that he had "more than enough" funds to retain counsel. R. 2971:9-10.
She then identified and defined the "three types of waiver of [cjounsel" recognized
in Utah, emphasizing the third type: waiver by conduct. R. 2971:10-11. She
explained that such a waiver could be found once the court warned a defendant that
there was a problem and gave him a chance to change his behavior, and she
explained that Defendant's problem involved his "dilatory tactics[.]" R. 2971:11.
Not only had Defendant had more than three years and "many opportunities to get
Counsel" and failed to do so, she explained, but he seemed to "enjoy acting as [his
own] attorney[.]" R. 2971:11-12. She was "very, very concerned" by his continued
insistence on a legal education before hiring counsel, noting that there was no right
to or time for such an education. R. 2971:17. Defendant again blamed the court,
claiming the judge did not give him "access" to counsel or an opportunity to have
counsel. R. 2971:17-21. The judge stressed that by his own actions, Defendant "may
deprive [himjself of that right." R. 2971:17.
Over Defendant's protests, Judge Laycock walked through the remainder of
the colloquy, touching on the time Defendant had spent in this case studying the
law and noting how beneficial any prior experience in self-representation would be.
29
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R. 2971:10-14. She explained that he knew about the charges against him and
reviewed with him their potential sentences. R. 2971:14-15. She warned that he
would not be able to claim his own ineffectiveness should he represent himself
poorly, and that he risked spending "substantially the rest of [his] life in prison" if
he made a mistake. R. 2971:15. She would give him no help if he represented
himself, leaving him "on [his] own" and bound to comply with the rules of both
evidence and procedure. R. 2971:15-16.

She noted that he had demonstrated

throughout the case "some familiarity" with the rules, but that he was not familiar
enough "to make it through a trial and to do a good job[,]" emphasizing her
remarks with a specific example in the paperwork he handed her as the hearing
began. Id. She warned him that if he chose to testify, he could not simply tell his
story, and he would be cross examined by experienced attorneys. Id. She expressed
her opinion that "it would be far better for [him] to get an attorney on board" and
that despite his apparent pleasure in acting as his own counsel, he would ultimately
do himself "immense harm." R. 2971:16-18.
At the end of the hearing, Defendant again asked for unmonitored calls, and
the judge offered to call the jail to ensure it. R. 2971:24. Instead, the judge issued a
written order when Defendant objected to what he claimed would be an "ex parte
communication with close associates of the alleged victims." R. 2971:25.
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Shortly thereafter, Defendant moved to continue the competency hearing,
outlining his most recent efforts to obtain counsel R. 1731-33/7. Judge Laycock
granted the motion and moved the hearing to February 2. R. 2972:17. In doing so,
she stated that she would not "micro-manage the jail" and that if Defendant
"needed help in dealing with... [his] grievances with the jail," he could "contact an
attorney from the ACLU." R. 2972:10. She also stressed that the added time
permitted him not only to call counsel, but to write to them, and she detailed how
best to address the envelope to ensure confidentiality, and how important it was to
assure the recipients that he had "the means to retain them." R. 2972:12-13. She
reminded Defendant of the warnings she gave at the previous hearing about the
dangers and perils of self-representation and reiterated her advice that he "do
whatever is necessary" to get counsel because the hearing was "going to go
forward" whether or not he appeared with counsel R. 2972:18.
Defendant later attempted to continue the February hearing, again blaming
the jail and the judge for his lack of counsel because he was given no confidential
contact with prospective attorneys. R. 1798-1846/7; R. 2973:8,10. Judge Laycock
found the claim to be "without any value or validity" in view of the "years . . . of
opportunities [he has had] to obtain Counsel[,]" multiple attempts from various
judges to help him obtain counsel, the appearance of both appointed and private
31
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counsel in this matter, and the availability of funds to retain counsel. R. 2973:10-12.
At the request of the prosecution, the judge again addressed all of the issues
required by Houston, opining that, while Defendant's "extremely dilatory conduct"
"probably" amounted to forfeiture of the right to counsel, it definitely amounted to
a waiver by conduct. R. 2973:13-14. She reiterated her warnings to Defendant that
continuation of that conduct could amount to a waiver of counsel, and she reviewed
the opportunities he had been given to avoid the waiver. R. 2973:14-15. She
ultimately found that although Defendant claimed to want counsel, he knowingly
and voluntarily waived that right through his continued dilatory tactics. R. 2973:1420. The judge stressed that Defendant could still obtain counsel "at any time" but
that until then, he would represent himself. R. 2973:19-20: Defendant continued to
complain about the lack of confidentiality in his attempts to hire counsel, but when
the matter came before the court for trial thirteen months later, Defendant
proceeded to represent himself without voicing any request for stand-by counsel or
any concern for proceeding pro se.
Based on the foregoing, the record is clear that Defendant implicitly waived
his right to counsel by his dilatory conduct. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^|f 45-51.
Defendant's waiver was voluntary because the trial court explicitly identified the
unacceptable conduct and unequivocally warned Defendant that he must hire an
32
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attorney to represent him at the competency hearing or proceed pro se. See Cabrera,
2007 UT App 194, ^ 16. It was knowing and intelligent because the court adhered to
Houston and was equally clear in providing a thorough colloquy at two hearings.
See id. Unlike the situation in Pedockie, nothing in Judge Laycock's statements were
inconsistent or confusing, and she provided Defendant with ample opportunity to
correct the unacceptable conduct and avoid a waiver. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, |^f
47-50 (no implied waiver because the court sua sponte imposed a waiver at a time
when Pedockie did nothing objectionable, and because Pedockie was never given a
colloquy or its equivalent). As there is no justification for Defendant's refusal to
comply with Judge Laycock's warning and to hire counsel, this Court should affirm
the finding of an implied waiver of the right to counsel.

in.
THE SUMMARY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS WERE
JUSTIFIED, DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE AND AN
OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND, AND JUDGE LAYCOCK
PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE CONTEMPT ORDER
Defendant contends that he is entitled to a reversal of Judge Davis' order
finding him in contempt for failing to attend an evidentiary hearing scheduled at
Defendant's request. See Aplt. Br. at 35-38. Specifically, he argues that the alleged
contempt was criminal in nature and carried with it a constitutional right to a
hearing and an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt charge, both of
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n

which he was denied.

Id. at 26, 35-38 (Point III). On the contrary, summary

proceedings were justified and, in any event, appropriate due process protections
were observed where Defendant had notice and an opportunity to defend against
the contemptuous conduct. Defendant also challenges the propriety of Judge
Laycock's findings underlying her affirmance of the contempt order. See id. at 38-41
(Point IV). His failure to marshal the evidence, however, defeats his claim.
Background. Defendant's argument concerns an evidentiary hearing that
was scheduled for August 14,2006, pursuant to several defense motions, including
Defendant's motion to strike the competency report of Dr. Mejia. R. 1454/5; 147779/6. Dr. Mejia had been subpoenaed for the hearing and was in court. R. 1478/6.
Despite having been present in court on August 7 when Judge Davis set the hearing
for 8:30 a.m., and having been given a copy of the minute entry reflecting the time of
the August 14 hearing, Defendant refused to be transported for the hearing, later
claiming that he thought the hearing was scheduled for the afternoon.8 R. 145455/5; 1479/6; 1493-97/6; 1539/6. Judge Davis was ultimately informed of the
7

Defendant's one-sentence assertion of a deprivation of other unidentified
"legal rights" (Aplt. Br. at 38) is inadequately briefed and is not further addressed
herein. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43,1(23, n.9,48 P.3d 918.
8

No transcript of the August 7 and 14 hearings appears in the appellate

record.
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situation by "jail transportation" and found that Defendant had voluntarily
absented himself from the hearing, held him in contempt, and ordered him to pay
Dr. Mejia's costs associated with the hearing.9 R. 1477-79/6; 1539/6 (the contempt
order is attached in Addendum C).
Defendant filed a motion challenging the decision and argued it to newlyassigned Judge Laycock on October 2, 2006. R. 1486-97/6; 1539/6; R. 2969:11-13.
He gave her his copy of the August 7 minute entry and argued that it appeared to
reflect that the hearing was to start at 2:30 p.m. R. 2969:11-12. Judge Laycock
acknowledged that the minute entry copy could be viewed as either an "8" or a "2,"
but was unpersuaded by Defendant's argument, finding instead that that Defendant
had voluntarily absented himself from the August 14 hearing. R. 1677-78/6 (the
written ruling is attached in Addendum C). She relied on evidence that Defendant
was present in court on August 7 when the hearing was set for 8:30 a.m., that
Defendant received a copy of the minute entry as a reminder, and that when jail
transportation officers sought to transport him for the scheduled hearing, Defendant
could have gone but chose not to. Id.10

9

The State later submitted an invoice from Dr. Mejia totaling $875.00. R. 166062/6. The record does not reflect that Defendant paid the invoice.
10
Defendant sought to challenge Judge Laycock's decision by filing his twelfth
petition for interlocutory review (Case No. 20061112—CA) as well as a notice of
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A, Judge Davis'Contempt Order
Defendant argues that Judge Davis violated his procedural due process rights
by entering an ex parte criminal contempt order and proceeding in a summary
fashion when the situation involved a matter of "indirect" contempt requiring
compliance with heightened procedural protections.11 See Aplt. Br. at 35-38.
Contrary to his assertions, the proceedings below were justified and afforded him
the necessary procedural protections.
Summary contempt sanctions are appropriate under certain circumstances.
See Gardiner v. York, 2010 UT App 108, 1 40, 233 P.3d 500; Von Hake v. Tliomas,
759 P.2d 1162,1171 (Utah 1988) (failure to appear in violation of court order can,
appeal (Case No. 20061137-CA). R. 1771-73/7; 1778/7; 1875/7; 1986/8; see also
State v. Santonio, 2007 UT App 108U (per curiam). This Court denied the former
filing and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order. R. 1778/7;
1986/ 8; Santonio, 2007 UT App 108U.
Judge Laycock also rejected Defendant's challenge to Dr. Mejia's fees. R.
2017/8; 2025/8. Defendant filed an appeal which this Court dismissed for lack of a
final appealable order. See State v. Santonio, 2007 UT App 386U (per curiam). This
Court held that the contempt order was "clearly remedial in nature" and, hence,
civil, not criminal, as Defendant now claims. Id.; Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1167-68 & n.4 (Utah 1988). That decision is binding. See IHC Health Services, Inc. u. D
& K Management, Inc., 2008 UT 73, f t 26,28,196 P.3d 588.
11

Defendant makes a cursory reference to the state constitution, but provides
no separate state constitutional analysis. Hence, this Court need only address his
federal constitutional claim. See State v. Talbot, 2010 UT App 352, f 6, n.4, — P.3d —
-, 2010 WL 4997096.
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in appropriate circumstances, be treated as "direct contempt"). However, the
labels of "direct" and "indirect" are no longer determinative of whether such
sanctions are appropriate. See York, 2010 UT App 108, f 39. Instead, summary
proceedings are appropriate in cases "where the contemptuous conduct occurs in
open court or in the presence of the judge, disturbs the court's business, and
necessitates immediate punishment." Id. at f 40 (citing Pounders v. Watson, 521
U.S. 982, 988,117 S. Ct. 2359 (1997) (per curiam)). These requirements were met
in this case, justifying the summary proceedings.
The record reflects that the contempt occurred in open court and in the
presence of the judge. R. 1470-71/6. It "disturbed] the court's business"
because the hearing for which Defendant failed to appear was primarily an *
evidentiary hearing set as a result of his own motion to strike Dr. Mejia's
competency report. R. 1402-16/5; 1454-55/5. Dr. Mejia's presence and
Defendant's need to support his motion were predictable and necessary. .
Accordingly, when Defendant failed to appear, the court was unable to proceed,
despite the presence of Dr. Mejia. R. 1470-71/6.
Finally, Defendant's voluntary absence necessitated immediate
punishment because it was not only unnecessary and self-serving, but it was the
latest in a series of defense-related delays that once again stalled a case that was,
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at that time, more than three years old, filled more than five volumes of
pleadings, and had not yet progressed to a preliminary hearing. Moreover, the
delay, which was solely attributable to Defendant and was easily avoidable, was
not the first time Defendant had refused to be transported to court, and it
inconvenienced not only the court and counsel, but an expert witness as well. R.
624/3; 862/3; 994/4; 1061-62/4. Under the circumstances, it presented a
foreboding of things to come if not immediately and memorably addressed.
Even if the need to redress Defendant's conduct and curtail the possibility of
its recurrence was not sufficient justification for immediate punishment, the
requisite due process requirements were met where Defendant had both adequate
notice and an opportunity to defend the contempt charge, albeit after the initial
contempt order. See Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1171 n.7 (should summary proceedings
lack justification, due process requirements may still be met where contemner is
allowed "a reasonable opportunity to seek relief from the contempt order by
presenting the court with facts previously unknown to it which would constitute a
valid defense for the charge of contempt/').
The record reflects that Defendant received reasonable notice. He was told at
the August 7 hearing of the time and date for the evidentiary hearing with Dr.
Mejia, knew the hearing was being held pursuant to his own motion, knew that Dr.
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Mejia would be there and, hence, necessarily knew his presence was required. He
was verbally informed of the time of the hearing and was given a copy of the
minute entry reflecting that information. R. 1454-55/5. The jail personnel's attempt
to transport him in time for the morning hearing offered additional reinforcement
that the hearing was set for the morning. He has at no time alleged any difficulty
with either his memory or his hearing. In any event, Defendant admitted that he
became aware of Judge Davis7 contempt order the same day it was announced. R.
1493-94/6; 1497/6.
Defendant also had a meaningful opportunity to be heard as to his
conduct. When he heard of the contempt order, he sought relief by filing his
motion to alter or amend it. R. 1485-97/6. That motion, and the oral argument .
thereon, provided Defendant "a reasonable opportunity to seek relief from the
contempt order" and satisfied the due process requirements attendant to a civil
contempt order by providing him ample opportunity to address his
contemptuous conduct and to present any and all defenses thereto. See Von Hake,
759 P.2d at 1171 n.7; see also Gardiner, 2010 UT App 108, % 28/ Defendant
presented his challenges to Judge Laycock without limitation by the court and
was permitted to adduce evidence to support his claims. R. 1485-97/6; 157071/6; R. 2969: passim.
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Defendant contends that it was the delay in receiving a written copy of
Judge Davis' contempt order that" denied [him] an opportunity to assert" his
defenses of mental illness and mistake of law to Judge Laycock. n See Aplt. Br. at
35, 38. Without the written order, he claims, he was unaware that Judge Davis
had relied on his presence at the August 7 hearing and, hence, did not realize he
needed to address that fact. See id. at 38-39. He fails, however, to explain how
either of the defenses was dependent on this information. Moreover, he had the
best notice possible: he was present in court on August 7 when he received his
copy of the minute entry and was informed of the time of the hearing. Thus, the
potential relevance of the hearing should have been readily apparent to him.
Accordingly, to the extent the defenses of mental illness and mistake of law were
insufficiently presented below, it was through Defendant's own fault, not a lack
of notice or opportunity. R. 1486-97; R. 2969: passim. Under these circumstances,
Defendant has not shown that the lower court violated his due process rights.

1^

12

Defendant's claim that he was prevented from asserting the defense of
mistake of fact is without merit where his motion and his argument detailed his
mistaken belief that the hearing was set for 2:30 p.m. instead of 8:30 a.m. See Aplt.
Br. at 39-40; R. 1495-96/6; R. 2969:11-13, 30-31.
13

Any error in the trial court's handling of the contempt matter would affect
the contempt order alone, not the underlying criminal conviction. See Gardiner, 2010
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B. Judge Laycock's Affirmance
Defendant also challenges Judge Laycock's affirmance of the contempt
order, arguing that the judge erred in (1) finding that he was required to go to
court when requested by jail staff and (2) not finding that his conduct was in
keeping with his reading of the minute entry. See Aplt. Br. at 38-41.
To the extent Defendant challenges Judge Lay cock's findings of fact, his
failure to properly marshal the evidence defeats his claims. See Ostermiller v.
Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43, | | 19-24, 233 P.3d 489 (holding an appellate court may
decline to address a challenged factual finding where challenger fails to marshal
supporting evidence); State v. Hurst, 821 R2d 467,471 (Utah App. 1991)
(accepting challenged finding and conclusion regarding contempt order due to
defendant's failure to marshal).
In any event, neither challenge requires reversal of Judge Laycock's
decision. Defendant's claim involves Judge Laycock's comments that the fluidity
of court schedules and judicial proceedings requires inmates to go to court
whenever asked by jail personnel. R. 2969:32 (written and verbal rulings
attached in Addendum C). However, his contempt was not founded on his
UT App 108, f 48 (reversing improper contempt order independent of underlying
judgment).
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refusal to go to court when jail personnel requested it It was founded on his
refusal to be transported after having been told personally the previous week
what time he had to be at court for the hearing: what Judge Laycock viewed as
the "bottom line." R. 1677-78/6; R. 2969:31-32. Whether the request of jail
personnel is viewed as a reaffirmation of the early court setting or, as Defendant
claims, a compulsion of which he was unaware, the contempt ruling remains
valid under the relevant facts, and Defendant's challenge fails.
Finally, Judge Laycock was not required to accept Defendant's assertion
that he believed the minute entry said 2:30 given evidence putting Defendant in
court on August 7 and given Defendant's copy of the minute entry. R. 2969:1112,31-32. The judgeacknowledged that the minute entry could be read as
either an 8 or a 2, but in view of the remaining evidence, she was unpersuaded
that Defendant did not know that the hearing was at 8:30. R. 2969:31. That
decision is fully supported by the evidence.
IV,
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REQUIRED RE-EVALUATION
OF DEFEND ANTS MENTAL STATE TO FOCUS ON THE IMPACT
OF ANY MENTAL ILLNESS ON HIS ABILITY TO FORM THE
REQUISITE INTENT FOR THE CHARGED CRIMES
When Defendant entered pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity at his
arraignment, the judge ordered "the Department of Human Services to examine
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the defendant and investigate his mental condition at the time of the offense" as
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-301. R. 2136-37/9; 2177/9. The judge
eventually received two reports and determined that one did "not consider the
appropriate criteria," while the other was "somewhat closer in its analysis." R.
2217. The court then ordered both experts to answer the following question:
Did the defendant, at the time of the offense, suffer from a
mental illness as defined in UCA § 76-2-305(4)(a), that prevented him
from forming the intent to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
commit the crimes with which he is charged?
R. 2216/9 (attached in Addendum D); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(l)(a) (emphasis in
court's order).
Defendant contends that this order improperly permitted the evaluating
psychologists "to testify by inference" regarding the ultimate issue of whether he
was able to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes, thereby violating rule
704(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.14 See Aplt. Br. at 42.

Defendant also purports to argue that the trial court's entry of multiple
orders regarding his evaluation undermined his ability to represent himself and
violated his federal due process rights. See Aplt. Br, at 26-27 (referring to original
order (R. 2156-64/9), order as amended at Defendant's request (R. 2174-77/9), and
order challenged in the text of his argument (R. 2215-17/9). Inasmuch as the claim
appears only in the Summary of Arguments, the State does not address the claims
further. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see also Russell v. Tliomas, 2000 UT App 82, | 9,
n.9,999 P. 2d 1244 (refusing to address an issue raised in the Summary of Argument
section but not developed in the argument section).
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Rule 704(b) provides:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a
defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact
alone.
Utah R. Evid. 704(b). He further claims that the order "imposes criteria stricter than
the statute, which had the effect of confusing the issue and eliminating defendant's
lawful affirmative defense." Aplt. Br. at 42. He offers no elaboration. See id.
This Court should decline to address the latter claim because it is not
adequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, If 13 ("An
issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to
shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court."). The language
quoted above represents the entirety of Defendant's argument. See Aplt. Br. at 42.
Because it falls far short of the burden outlined in rule 24(a)(9) and leaves to the
State and the Court the burden of interpreting and researching the claim, it should
be disregarded. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, f 23, n.9,48 P.3d 918 ("A
single, vague sentence without citation to the record or legal authority is
inadequate" to properly brief the issue for appeal); State v. Smith, 2010 UT App 231,
^f 3, 238 P.3d 1103 (declining to address an inadequately briefed issue).
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The remainder of Defendant's challenge lacks merit. The court's order sought
appropriate information in light of Defendant's intent to assert mental health
defenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(1)(a). The mere fact that the court solicited
such information does not render it admissible in court. It simply sought to
establish the availability of the mental health defense proposed by Defendant. It
did not attempt, by its order, to assess the admissibility of that information under
rule 704 or to alter the burden of proving Defendant's guilt at trial. In fact, the judge
found it unnecessary to address the admissibility of the information prior to trial
inasmuch as the State announced that it would not call either evaluator to testify in
its case-in-chief. R. 2467/10. Instead, the judge explained that the matter would be
addressed only if the need to do so arose at trial. Id. Defendant makes no reference
to the trial testimony and no claim that any of the allegedly inadmissible
information was offered or admitted at trial. See Aplt. Br. at 41-42. Accordingly, his
challenge to the pre-trial order fails to present any error warranting relief. See Utah
R. Crim. P. 30.
V.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMED BRADY VIOLATION FAILS ABSENT
PROOF THE EVIDENCE WAS EXCULPATORY
Defendant contends that the trial court violated his due process rights when it
denied his motion for access to a computer disc that held photographs of the crime
45
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scene.

See Aplt. Br. at 42-44. He argues that the disc "contains evidence in digital

form that is exculpatoryf,]" and the State's failure to relinquish it violated his due
process rights under Brady v. Maiyland, 373 U.S. 83,83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). Aplt. Br. at
43. No review of this claim is warranted, however.
A Brady violation occurs only upon proof that
The State suppressed information that (1) remained unknown to the
defense both before and throughout trial and (2) was material and
exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have created a 'reasonable
probability' that 'the result of the proceeding would have been
different/
State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,"f 33, 37 P.3d 1073 (citation omitted); see also State v.
Hamblin, 2010 UT App 239, If 14,239 P.3d 300.
Defendant fails both requirements. First, he filed a motion requesting the disc
on December 28, 2007—three months before trial.
Second, he offers no evidence that the disc contains any "material" or
"exculpatory" information. "Evidence is constitutionally material if there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different

1

defendant's final sentence includes a claim that the State's failure to provide
the information "constitutes prosecutorial misconduct." Aplt. Br. at 44. This
gratuitous mention of a new issue, devoid of any legal authority or analysis, fails to
meet the minimum briefing requirements, and the State does not address it further.
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 23,101 P.3d 387 (refusing to
reach conclusory and inadequately briefed claim).
46
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, % 31,
979 P.2d 799 (quotations and citation omitted).

Defendant claims that the

exculpatory evidence consists of some sort of digital evidence that the photographs
were taken on different days. See Aplt. Br. at 43. However, he identifies no
evidence suggesting that such information exists digitally, let alone that it exists on
this disc. Hence, his claim that the State withheld material exculpatory evidence "is
so speculative that it is impossible to see how it could have affected the outcome of
the trial." State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984).
VI.
DEFENDANTS CHALLENGE TO EXCLUSION OF DEFENSE
EXHIBITS 2 AND 8 FAILS DUE TO INADEQUATE BRIEFING
Defenda$t claims that the trial court erred in refusing to admit at trial defense
exhibits 2 and 8. See Aplt. Br. at 44-46. Exhibit 2 is a police report written by Officer
Ray Edwards that relates in some unidentified way to "events that occurred at the
time of arrest[.]" Id. at 44-45 (capitalization omitted); R. 2977:43, 47; 2980:54-56.
Exhibit 8 is a state crime lab report showing that there was no blood found on the
knife that was located at the crime scene. R. 2977:44. Because Defendant's
arguments as to both exhibits fail to meet minimum briefing requirements, this
Court need not address them. See Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 15.
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"An adequate brief is one that fully identifies and analyzes the issues with
citation to relevant legal authority/' State v. lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 22,128 P.3d 1179
(citing State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, f 11, 108 P.3d 710). "Mere 'bald citation to
authority/ devoid of any analysis, is not adequate." Id. (quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999
UT 1, f 31, 973 R2d 404) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues that the police report, Exhibit 2, was admissible under rule
803(8), Utah Rules of Evidence, simply because it was a police report and was
"'offered by the defendant in a criminal case to support his defense/" Aplt. Br. at 45
(quoting State v, Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181,1184-85 (Utah 1983)). However, the authority
on which he relies requires that a proper foundation be laid before the report will be
admitted.

See Bertul; 664 P.2d at 1184/ Utah R. Evid. 803(8) (providing for

admissibility "unless the resources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trust worthiness."). Judge Laycock excluded the report based, in part, on a
. lack of foundation. R. 2977:55. Yet Defendant makes no effort to address the
foundation requirement. He fails even to provide this Court with the information
necessary for it to conduct an appropriate analysis. Instead, he simply states; "By
its markings (and the fact it was given to Defendant as part of discovery), Exhibit #2
was admissible." See Aplt. Br. at 45. This argument lacks meaningful analysis of
the specific facts of this case and should be summarily rejected.
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Defendant also argues that the crime lab report, Exhibit 8, was admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule. See id. at 45-46. This argument likewise
lacks any meaningful legal analysis. Defendant fails to identify the applicable
hearsay exception, presents no mention of foundation, summarily provides that the
document is "authenticated under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 901[,]" and states,
without further elaboration, that the sole relevance of the document depended on its
presentation with evidence he admits he did not have at trial and whose absence he
does not challenge on appeal. See id.
Because Defendant's arguments are conclusory and lack meaningful analysis,
review is not warranted. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 23 (refusing to review conclusory
argument lacking legal analysis).
VII.
DEFEND ANTS CHALLENGE TO EXCLUSION OF DEFENSE
EXHIBITS 28 AND 29 FAILS FOR INADEQUATE BRIEFING
Defendant's first pro se claim of error challenges Judge Lay cock's exclusion
from trial of two proposed defense exhibits offered on the third day of trial: 1) a
certified copy of the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in federal
district court more than two years prior to the instant case, finding Defendant to be
incompetent (Defendant's Exhibit 28); and (2) Judge Laycock's memorandum
decision of May 7, 2007, discussing the findings of three doctors who examined
49
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Defendant for purposes of competency to proceed to trial (Defendant's Exhibit 29).
See Aplt. Br. at Dl-2; R. 2980:39-45. Defendant summarily argues that the exhibits
establish that he suffers from a mental illness and constituted "lawfully appropriate
evidence" that should have been admitted in support of his defense. See id. at D2.
Defendant's failure to provide any support for his position or to provide
analysis in terms of his ability to form the requisite mental state for the charged
crimes, however, defeats review of his claim. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Lee, 2006
UT 5,11 2 2 " 2 3 ; Smith, 2010 UT App 231,13 (adequate briefing includes citation to
authority, development of that authority, and reasoned analysis based on that
authority).
Moreover, he ignores the trial court's reasons for excluding the evidence: lack
of foundation, irrelevance, and inadmissible hearsay. R. 2862/12; R. 2980:43-45. He
simply contends that the court was required to take judicial notice of the exhibits
and assumes that they then become admissible. See Aplt. Br. at 1-2. His argument
lacks sufficient authority or analysis to permit appellate review of his claim. See
Smith, 2010 UT App 231,1 3.
VIII.
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURTS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE A JURY INSTRUCTION DEFINING
"ATTEMPT"
50
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Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the
definition of "attempt." See Aplt. Br. at D2-7. He argues that "attempt" was an
element of each of the charged offenses, that he submitted a proposed instruction,
and that the absence of the instruction requires reversal of his convictions.16 See id.
at D3-5. However, Defendant is not entitled to appellate review of the matter
because, even assuming any error in the absence of the instruction, he invited it.
The invited error doctrine prevents a defendant from attempting to obtain a
reversal on appeal based on an error he helped to create in the trial court. See State
v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, f 11,236 P.3d 155; see also State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT
16, Tf 9,86 P.3d 742. "A defendant invites error where he 'affirmatively approve[s]
of the jury instructions' at trial." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 26,153 P.3d

Defendant claims that his "attempt" instruction was included in a pretrial
"motion for proposed jury instructions[.]" See Aplt. Br. at D3. In fact, Defendant
filed no such motion. He also contends that it was mailed to the court "along with"
a Motion for Picture of the Holster and other documents. See id. In fact, Defendant's
proposed instruction is not "with" but attached to a document entitled "Notice of
Affirmative Defense of Compulsion" which he filed on December 7, 2007 — more
than three months prior to his trial. R. 2347-10/10. Significantly, the instruction
does not appear in the proposed instructions separately submitted by Defendant a
month earlier. See R. 2956 (exhibit envelope), "Defendant's Proposed Jury
Instructions." This explains the trial court's determination in ruling on Defendant's
motion to arrest judgment that neither party submitted such an instruction to the
court. R. 2862/12.
51
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804 (quoting State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, | 8,132 P.3d 703). Defendant did
just that in this case, thereby waiving appellate review of his claim.
The court provided both parties with a copy of the anticipated jury
instructions by the end of the second day of trial. R. 2980:4. Judge Laycock met
with the parties the next morning, and Defendant actively participated in review
and discussion of the final jury instructions. R. 2980:4-27. He made no reference to
his proposed instruction on "attempt7' during the discussion. Id. After discussing
the need for any lesser included offense instruction, Judge Laycock stated, "Now,
are we done talking about jury instructions then?" R. 2980:27-34. The prosecutor
responded, "State is[,]" and Defendant said, "I am too, your Honor." Id. In so
responding, Defendant informed the court that he had no objections to the
remaining instructions. See Maese, 2010 UT App 106, \ 11. The conversation then
shifted to a discussion of evidentiary issues. R. 2980:34.
Because Defendant did not object and, in essence, actively approved of the
jury instructions, he invited any error that exists in the court's failure to give his
proposed instruction. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to appellate review of
this claim. See Maese, 2010 UT App 106, f 12.
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IX,
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF HIS
CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF HIS
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to arrest
judgment on one of two bases and that her failure to do so amounted toiperse error.
See Aplt. Br. at D7-9. He claims first that the trial court was bound by vertical stare
decisis to follow decisions from a higher court, and that Judge Laycock had no
discretion to deny his motion where the facts were not in dispute and a strict rule of
law applied. See id. at D7. He then contends in a single sentence devoid of citation
to any authority that, regardless of why his "attempt" instruction was omitted,
Judge Laycock had a "positive duty" to arrest judgment because of its absence. See
id. This argument fails for inadequate briefing. See Peterson, 2002 UT 43, f 23, n.9.
Defendant then claims that he was entitled to an arrest of judgment "as a
matter of law" because the jail personnel interfered with his ability to select counsel,
thereby depriving him of his right to counsel of his choice. See Aplt. Br. at D7-9.
This claim fails because he fails to provide any authority or analysis supporting his
perse claim.
Specifically, he argues that the court was required to believe his accounts that
jail personnel interfered with his mail, his calls, and his visits with counsel because
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the State offered no evidence to contradict those claims. See id. at D8-9. Upon these
facts, he claims, the court was required to find that his right to counsel of choice was
violated and arrest judgment. See id. He offers no authority, however, establishing
his assumption that the alleged interference could be redressed by the trial court in
these criminal proceedings, that it amounted to a violation of his right to counsel of
choice, or that his remedy is, as he claims, to have the judgment arrested. Where his
argument contains numerous gaps and unsupported conclusions, it fails to reach
"the threshold of argumentative completeness mandated by rule 24[,]" and this
Court need not reach it. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 23.
X.
DEFENDANT'S CUMULATIVE ERROR ARGUMENT LACKS
MERIT

.

Finally, Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial and a change of
venue due to the cumulative error that occurred below. See Aplt. Br. at D9.
'"A reviewing court will reverse a jury verdict under the cumulative error
doctrine only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines . . .
confidence that a fair trial was had/" State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42,139,220 P.3d 136
(quoting State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, If 56, 191 P.3d 17 (omission in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted in Gallegos)).
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Defendant has failed to establish any error below, let alone multiple errors.
See Arguments, supra. To the extent this Court finds any errors exist, they do not
undermine confidence that Defendant received a fair trial under the circumstances
of this case.
Viewing the proceedings in their full context, there is no doubt that Defendant
received a fair trial. Consequently, his cumulative error claim is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted January 0 ,2011.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

4CRfs C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Coun
of Utah County. State of Utar
_^L^5^Jfeyr--

Der

""."

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMADOR SANTONIO

) EX PARTE ORDER
;
)
> Case No. 031402469 & 041402807
)
1 Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter came before the court on August 14, 2006 for an evidentiary hearing on the report by
Dr Juan Mejia to the court on the question of defendant's competency; L. Guy Probert
represented the state. The court found that the evidentiary hearing was scheduled for 8:30am this
day; the court heard from jail transportation that defendant claimed the evidentiary hearing was
scheduled for 2:30 pm and that he refused to be transported for 8:30am; The court found that the
evidentiary hearing had been scheduled in defendant's presence on August 7, 2006 for 8:30 am
on August 14, 2006 and that there was nothing in the record to support defendant's claim that the
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evidentiary hearing was scheduled for 2:30 pm and therefore that defendant had voluntarily
absented himself from the proceedings.
The court noted that Dr Juan Mejia was present, having been subpoenaed for the evidentiary
hearing.
The state, noting the defendant had previously refused to co-operate with one evaluator appointed
pursuant to the court's order on granting the state's petition for an inquiry into defendant's
competency, renewed its motion for the appointment of a fourth evaluator. The state argued that
if the court struck Dr Mejia's report there would only be one report before the court. If the court
did not strike Dr Mejia's report there would be two reports before the court but they would be in
conflict as to whether defendant is competent, leaving the court with the difficult task of
choosing between two experts when they are in disagreement. In either event it would be
appropriate to have a farther evaluation.
ORDER
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
a.

That the defendant pay the costs of subpoena and attendance by Dr Juan Mejia for
August 14, 2006;

b.

That a fourth evaluation of defendant's competency be conducted by the
Department of Human Services;
2
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c.

Dated this

That a scheduling conference is set for August 30,2006 at 1.0:00am

2/

day of August, 2006
BY THE

Fourth Judicial District Court
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMADOR SANTONIO
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

Case No. 031402469 & 041402S07 &
Judge Claudia L. Laycock

This matter came Before the court on October 2,2006 for hearing on pro se motions of the
defendant: 1. to amend or alter a judgment (which asked the court to vacate the appointment of
another [fourth] evaluator, to re-set oral arguments on the motion to strike the report of Dr Mejia
and vacate the order for costs of Dr Mejia against defendant with respect to the hearing on
August 14,2006), 2. to strike the report of Dr Juan Mejia and 3. for a competency [mental]
hearing. L. Guy Probert represented the state. Defendant appeared pro se. Having read the
memoranda of the parties, having heard oral arguments on the motions supported by submission
of an item of documentary evidence by defendant and after due consideration, the court made the

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

following findings of fact and conclusions of law and made the following orders:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As to defendant's motion to amend or alter judgment:
A.

As to the finding by Judge Davis that defendant voluntarily absented himself from the
hearing on August 14, 2006:
1.

Defendant was present in court on August 7, 2006 at the time the evidentiary
hearing with respect to the report submitted by Dr Juan Mejia was scheduled and
no other hearing was set for him at that time; defendant was supplied with a copy
of the court's minute entry;

2.

That such evidentiary hearing, as disclosed by the original of the court's minute
entry, was in fact scheduled for 8:30am on August 14, 2006.

3.

That the copy of the court's minute entry for the appearance of defendant on
August 7, 2006, provided to the defendant by the court and introduced by the
defendant into evidence on hearing of his motion, discloses that the evidentiary
hearing was in fact scheduled for 8:30am on August 14, 2006;

4.

That defendant was, by his own admission during these proceedings, requested by
transportation officers at the Utah County Jail to come to court for the scheduled
hearing;
2
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5.

That defendant made a decision not to attend when requested by transportation
officers and therefore voluntarily absented himself from the evidentiary hearing
and that to rule otherwise would be to open the door to jail inmates to decide
when and if they will come to court.

B.

As to vacating the appointment of another [fourth] evaluator:
1.

While the title to Chapter 15 of Title 77 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, does state that the chapter relates to inquiry into the sanity of the
defendant, the court is not concerned with the title to the chapter but with the
substance of the chapter.

2.

§77-15-2 requires a 2-pronged approach to the determination of question whether
a defendant is incompetent to proceed.

3.

There is no issue under the first prong (§77-15-2(1)).

4.

The second prong, as contained in §77-15-2(2), poses a very interesting issue in
this case but it is an issue which should not be addressed at this time but in the
U^^o^^^ c c "
meatal hearing pursuant to §77-15-5(9) when that is held.

5.

The reports of Dr Wootton and Dr Panos relate to the question of defendant's
competency or incompetency at a different day and time from the present and are
not relevant to the consideration of this motion.
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6.

The statute at §77-15-5(2)(b) requires the court to appoint "at least two mental
health experts" to examine the defendant. This wording confers on the court a
limited discretion as to how many mental health experts it appoints in a particular
case. The statute does not limit the court to appointment of two mental health
experts and the court may, within its discretion, appoint more than two.

7.

The appointment, in the ex-parte order made August 14, 2006 and dated August
21, 2006, of a fourth mental health expert to examine defendantf the context being
that, of the three previously appointed in relation to the petition now before the
court, one found defendant competent, one found him incompetent and defendant
refused to co-operate with the third) was within the discretion of the court. It is
also in accord with the long established practice of the court in circumstances
such as those in this case and is allowed by statute.

As to vacating the order that defendant pay Dr Mejia's costs
1.

The award of Dr Mejia's costs was properly made against the defendant for
voluntarily absenting himself from the evidentiary hearing on August 14, 2006.

2.

The ex parte order made by Judge Davis at the evidentiary hearing on August 14,
2006 and dated August 21, 2006, included an order that defendant pay the costs of
Dr Juan Mejia's attendance at court on August 14, 2006 but the order signed by
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the court did not include the amount of those costSj -wr ck^x ^ ^
. ^ r p^jv^-^r b^
As to resetting oral arguments on defendant's motion to strike the report of Dr Mejia
1.

JJ*O>V*W^

This motion is made moot by these proceedings

As to defendant's motion to strike the report of Dr Juan Mejia:
A.

Defendant seeks to apply to Dr Mejia's report the standard for admissibility of all expert
testimony offered under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence from Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals , Inc, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Utah is not however a
Daubert state and considerations with respect to the admissibility of scientific evidence in
Utah are controlled by the Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388 (Utah 1989)

B.

Moreover, Rimmasch only applies with novel theories and there are no novel theories
here, so Rimmasch does not apply.

C.

That the court finds the MMPI, although disdained by defendant, is a helpful tool.

D.

Defendant seeks to challenge the substance, methods and results of Dr Mejia's report in
his absence and to launch a preemptory strike against the report.
IfviAiXZiiri^u

E.

The time to evaluate the merits, or otherwise, of Dr Mejia's report is in the me»tel
hearing under §77-15-5(9) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

As to the proceedings before the court, generally
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A.

There being an inquiry into the competency of the defendant before the court, all other
proceedings in the case are stayed.
ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

That the court sustains the order of Judge Lynn W. Davis made August 14, 2006 and
dated August 21, 2006 and confirms the appointment of a fourth mental health expert to
inquire into the competency of the defendant.

2.

That the fourth mental health expert may be Dr John Malouf who has already been
appointed pursuant to the order made by Judge Davis and dated August 21, 2006 or
whoever the Department of Human Services nominates for the purpose;

3.

That defendant co-operate with Dr Malouf or other mental health expert appointed by the
Department of Human Services in his inquiry into defendant's competency;

4.

That counsel for the state file a memorandum of Dr Juan Mejia's costs associated with his
attendance at the evidentiary hearing on August 14, 2006;

5.

That defendant's motion to alter or amend judgment:
as to the appointment of another [fourth] evaluator, is denied;
as to the re-setting of oral arguments on defendant's motion to strike the report of
Dr Mejia, is moot;
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as to vacation of the award of costs of Dr Mejia against the defendant, is denied
6.

That defendant's motion to strike the report ofDr Juan Mejia is denied;

7.

That defendant's motion for a competency hearing is premature and is therefore denied;

8.

That the matter be set for a review hearing on November 13, 2006 at 8:30am, to which
defendant will be transported, for the purpose of determining whether defendant has cooperated with the mental health expert and whether the report of the mental health expert
is available, and if it is, to set a mental hearing within the time limited by statute.

9.

All other proceedings with respect to the case being stayed by the inquiry into defendant's
competency, that the court will not entertain or rule on any other motions in the matter
while the inquiry into defendant's competency is pending.

Dated this

I3^K

day of Oetebei? 2006
BY THE COURT

, ^ 'J^ssya^

JLUJLL^^

Fourth Judicial District C©urt St
S£>&^*&'
Approved as to form and content

Amador Santonio, Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand mailed or transmitted by facsimile transmission a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order this J*' Day of October,
2006, for delivery to the following:

To:

Amador Santonio
Utah County Jail
3075 North Main Street,
Spanish Fork, Ut 84660
-egal'Secretary
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Case No. 031402469 FS
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AMADOR SANTONIO,
Defendant.

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
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Fourth District Court Judge
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For the State:
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UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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when he's trying to stake out land in the desert that doesn't

2

have any value.

3

up what he believes it should be; but he doesn't go out there

4

and do it because well, it ain't worth it.

5

think Dr. Mahea is lazy and he just didn't address it.

6

He goes out, he sits in his tent, and he makes

In this case I

As far as the issue of my coming to Court or not

7

coming to Court on that day, I believe culpability says what

8

was it in the defendant's point of view?

9

and see a 2:30?

Did he look at that

Did he not address it to the guards at the

10

jail?

11

kept bringing the issue up, thinking that I was supposed to

12

appear in the afternoon.

13

In fact, I was even locked down for two days because I

So I believe that if we look at it from culpability,

14

I'm not culpable.

15

I addressed the issue as I addressed it the week before,

16.

believing that those efforts would result in my being taken

17

to Court at the correct time.

18

I didn't do it knowingly or voluntarily.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let me take the issues one at

19

a time.

20

order made by Judge Davis, in which Judge Davis found that the

21

defendant had voluntarily refused to come to Court; and based

22

on that, Judge Davis ordered him to pay the cost for the doctor

23

who was brought to testify that day.

24
25

In this motion the defendant wants me to vacate an

As I look at this, it is possible to see that he might
have assumed that it was a 2, but it also looks like an 8.
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The

-32bottom line for me is that the defendant, was present when this
hearing was set.

It's the only hearing he had to be at.

He

had officers that were telling him that he needed to come to
Court, and he made his own decision that he would not go to
Court.
My assumption is that if the defendant is called down
and is supposed to go to Court, he'll respond and he'll go,
whether or not he thinks the officers may or may not be right.
There are times that we have people come over unnecessarily.
We call it "field trips."

There are also times when we change

hearings for one reason or the other, and because it happens at
the last minute, we may call the jail —

please sit down -- we

may call the jail and alter the list, and tell them to bring
someone.
My assumption is that the defendants will obey and
come when they are asked to come by the jail personnel.

I

think for me to rule otherwise is to open the door to jail
inmates who decide when and if they will come to Court.
(Coughing) excuse me.

Apologize for my illness today.

For those reasons, I will not vacate the order from
Judge Davis.

I note that the minute entry from that hearing

said that he was ordering the defendant to pay the costs before
any further hearings would be held in this matter.

However,

the actual signed order does not say that; and I will go with
the actual signed order.
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So my expectation is that Mr. Santonio will pay those

2

costs, and I will order the State to provide the Court with a

3

memorandum which outlines the costs that were incurred to pay

4

for zhe

Court at that time.

5
6

MR. SANTONIO: Your Honor, can I get transcripts of
today's hearing.

7

THE COURT: Excuse me, I'm not done, and you need to

8

be quiet.

As to Dr. Mahea's report, in all honesty, the

9

discussion that we've had today, in my opinion, is totally

10

unnecessary.

11

about Federal law and the Daubert case.

12

it as Daubert or Daubert, French, but apparently Mr. Daubert

13

really said it Mr. Daubert.

14

The defendant makes some interesting arguments

This is not a Daubert state.

Some people refer to

We do not follow the

15 ,1 Federal lav; with regard to the Daubert case.

We have a case

16

called Ramosh; and what both Daubert and Ramosh deal with are

17

not simple 702 -- Rule 702 issues.

18

scientific rules, and we're not dealing with novel scientific

19

theories here in this case.

20

Ramosh deals with novel

What the defendant attempts to do in his motion to

21

strike Dr. Mahea's report is to essentially launch a peremptory

22

strike.

23

wants the Court to go ahead and strike the report now without

24

a full hearing.

25

the results.

Without having Dr. Mahea here to defend his report, he

He's attacking the substance, the methods and

That's not appropriate for -- at this point in a
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UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

j
Plaintiff,

SECOND AMENDED ORDER FOR
EVALUATION, PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-301

vs.
Case No. 031402469
AMADOR SANTONIO,
Defendant.

Judge: Claudia Laycock
Division 3
Date: November 8,2007

The defendant, Amador Santonio, appeared before this court on November 7,2007.
Randy Kennard, Deputy Utah County Attorney, appeared on behalf of the State. The defendant
intends to claim that (1) he is not guilty by reason of insanity, or that (2) he had diminished
mental capacity, or that (3) he intends to assert special mitigation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5205.5.1
Pursuant to the court's earlier order, the court has now received reports from Drs.
Wootton and Malouf. The court finds that Dr. Wootton's report does not consider the
appropriate criteria, while Dr. Malouf s report is somewhat closer in its analysis. .The court now
enters the following amended

'Discussion was held between the court and the defendant as to the appropriateness of the
defendant's claim under this statute. Defendant claims that he can lift subsection (b) out of this
statute and apply it to this case. This court disagrees. Further discussion will undoubtedly occur
at a later date.
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ORDER
1. The court orders the experts, Drs. Wootton and Malouf, to answer the following
question, in reference to Utah Code Ann. 76-2-305(l)(a):
Did the defendant, at the time of the offense, suffer from a mental illness,
as defined in UCA §76-2-305(4)(a), that prevented him from forming the intent
to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly commit the crimes with which he is
charged?
2. The court refers the experts to UCA §§76-2-101 through 76-2-103 for further
,2
information regarding and definitions of the terms intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly?

3. The court also orders the experts to re-interview the defendant and re-evaluate the
other materials provided in order, as needed, in order to properly address the issue before them.
4. As the trial is now set for December 3, 4, and 6, 2007, the court requests that the
experts move with haste and expediency, so that they may deliver their revised reports no later
than November 23, 2007.
5. All other relevant orders from the previous Amended Order remain effective.
DATED this 8th day of November, 2007.
BYTHI

2

With one exception, all of the crimes charged in this matter share the same intent:
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. The exception is the crime of disarming a peace officer,
which provides for only one possible intent: intentionally.
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I certify that a true copy of the foregoing ruling was mailed on 0
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